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The expropriation of the foreign oil companies seemed to define Mexican national
character so sharply in 19A8 that everyone had attempted to appropriate its meaning
for his or her own ends. Even as the event unfolded, the chief protagonists sought to
explain what expropriation amounted to. Vicente Lombardo Toledano depicted the
crisis as one in which rapacious, money-grubbing foreign capitalists were ravaging
the national patrimony. Intellectually anti-imperialistic, he suggested that the
expropriation represented nothing less than economic emancipation of Mexico.1
President Lázaro Cárdenas also desired to explain the event in nationalistic terms. In
his nationwide radio speech of 18 March 1938, Cárdenas projected the crisis as one of
national sovereignty. The oil companies had brought the nationalization upon
themselves, he said, when they defied Mexican courts, sought diplomatic protection,
intervened in domestic politics, and provoked capital flight.2 Politicians, writers, and
scholars-not all of them Mexican-subsequently ha ve interpreted this event
basically within international parameters.3 Few inquire as to what the oil
nationalization meant in terms of the relationship between labor and the state,
essentially an internal matter. After all, it had been an oil workers' strike that
precipitated the crisis leading to expropriation.
This paper casts aside the standard perspectives to examine why, in addition to
patriotism, Mexican labor had played a prominent role in the Mexican oil
nationalization. It posits that the oil workers had pressured the Cárdenas
government, ultimately, to expropriate the Mexican oil industry. They began seizing
oil industry assets prior to the actual nationalization, and irnmediately thereafter, took
the leading role in replacing refinery and oil-field supervisors, both foreign and
Mexican, with loyal union members. The oil workers had seemed quite resolved to
shut down the oil industry, threatening ruin to the oil-dependent national economy, if
the need had arisen. In the process, they joined the political process rather than
shunning it. If the workers did indeed force the expropriation of the oil industry, why
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did they? What motivations did their behavior-as opposed to the rhetoric of their
leaders-belie? How did the struggle engender strong, sometimes tyrannical,
leadership?
This paper proposes that the Mexican oil workers, forming pan of the nation's
"labor aristocracy," were reacting to economic deterioration within the oil industry.
Oil workers organized, reluctantly, only to demand job security, of which seniority
rights were as imponant as wages. Their reactions to job insecurity gave rise to
internecine struggles, intense turf battles, and militant political action. Workers
negotiated with employers and politicians and among themselves. Of necessity, the
struggle strengthened those labor leaders who could deliver results, by whatever
means. Nationalization of a weakened and much reduced industry may not necessarily
have been the only solution guaranteeing the security of the workers. It was,
nonetheless, the logical outcome, given the oil companies' inability or refusal to
allay the insecurities of their own proletarians.
Proletarianization and Job Insecurity
Developing initially during the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, the foreign-owned oil
industry experienced a boom in the First World War, by the end of which Mexico
was the world's second leading producer of petroleum after the United States. Located
along Mexico's Gulf Coast, these oil fields escaped the worst depredations of the
Mexican Revolution. Approximately fifty thousand Mexicans had become employed
by the oil companies; many thousands of others migrated to Tampico and Minatitlán
to find work in the construction and service industries. They developed industrial
skills, earned three times the wage of agricultural peons, and severed their ties with
peasant villages. In a word, they became proletarianized.
Even so, the consequences of their increasing dependence on selling their labor
power did not become immediately apparent to the oil laborers. High wages and
burgeoning production helped the Mexicans tolerate the even higher wages and greater
privileges accorded to American workers. The honeymoon ended in 1915. The
economic dis10cation of revolution at home and the industrial scarcities produced by
world war abroad raised the workers' cost of living. When the foreign companies
refused to adj ust wages upward, laborers began organizing. Even before the 1917
Constitution recognized their rights, mechanics, boilermakers, firemen, pipefitters,
carpenters, and boatmen formed craft unions and struck for higher wages and parity
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with foreign workers. They often succeeded in raising wages, at least. Nonetheless,
theoil workers had never desired to smash foreign capital. Nor did they participate in
the events of the Revolution at Tampico.4 By 1919, their militancy cooled
considerably, as wartime shortages eased worldwide.
Then, the boom ended abruptly in 1920, once again disrupting the livelihoods of
the oil proletarians. Salt water invaded the Mexican oil reservoirs, and prices
sIumped d ue to overproduction in other parts of the world. In 1921, the companies
streamlined their operations and laid off several thousand laborers. Even as the
industry declined, its ownership became more consolidated. In 1919, Royal Dutch
Shell purchased the largest of the Mexico-based companies, El Aguila. This British
firm handled approximately 60 percent of the nation's oil business. The Standard Oil
Company of New Jersey in 1932 bought Mexico's second largest company, the
Huasteca. Petro-Mex, a state company, and other foreign concerns shared but a small
portion of production and markets.
Labor militancy carne in fits and starts. The workers were motivated by, but did
not unionize during, times of economic stress. They quietly suffered the postwar
depression, but the slight recovery motivated those still retaining their jobs to
organize anew. The old craft unions formed the nuclei of the refinery and terminal
unions of the mid-1920s. W orkers at the El Aguila refinery at Tampico, assisted by
local politicians, engineered a remarkable triumph in 1923. Their organizational
strike forced the company to sign the first collective contract in the industry. Pay
raises, the eight-hour workday, and indemnities for layoffs were among their
important gains.5 Laborers at other refineries soon followed suit. Oreat rivalry
existed between the labor leaders. They competed with the companies-and each
other-to control the workplace. Foreign, mostly American, supervisors and
workers were resented for their superior pay and privileges and for their rank racism.
Labor militancy now gained national significance. The Confederación Regional
Obrera Mexicana (CROM) sought to bring the oil unions into its national
organization, but with limited success. The Minatitlán refinery union carne under
CROM affiliation, only to have the nationalleaders in Mexico City, for a hefty fee,
negotiate an end to their 1925 strike directly with El Aguila.6 Tampico, however,
remained beyond the clutches of nationallabor leaders, and rivalries between labor
organizations often undermined the gains. Such was the case with the 1925 strike
against Huasteca. Refinery workers had just succeeded in unifying most of
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Huasteca's oil-field laborers into the first companywide union. But the new union's
officials rashly called a strike to force the company to dismiss rival labor leaders.
The government disapproved, the workers broke ranks, the strike failed, and
Huasteca's company-wide union disintegrated. Most of its members were never
rehired.7 Softening prices and additional production decline in the late 1920s
intimidated workers, permitting companies to economize their operations in Mexico.
The Depression contributed to the grudges that oil workers--or what was left of
them-were storing up. Crude production declined even further as international
prices once again took a nosedive. Newly acquired by Jersey Standard, Huasteca took
advantage of the soft markets to rebuild its refinery at Mata Redonda, across the river
from Tampico. Coming back on stream in 1932, the new refinery somewhat relieved
the unemployment in the city, but its operations now were more efficient.8 For
those still retaining their jobs, wages were reduced by 10 to 15 percent, a1though an
observer noted that the prices of foodstuffs did not vary. Smaller companies shut
down installations and merged with larger ones.9 At the Penn Mex Fuel Co., which
would soon merge with Huasteca, the readjustments for labor in 1931 included the
following: 10 15 percent of the workers were temporarily reduced; 10 percent were to
work one day less (five days instead of six); and 25 percent of the workers (the
highest paid) had their wages reduced by one-tenth.
Unions in all the companies, great and small, had to accept the cuts. It was no
time to strike while companies economized in order to stay competitive in the
international oil industry. Companies were vulnerable to direct action-to strikes-
only during times of expansion. Gil proletarians had suffered mightily in the great
layoffs of 1921 and the early 1930s. The decline in Mexican production and price
fluctuations in the world market reduced the number of oil laborers from fifty
thousand in 1920 to fifteen thousand in 1935.11 Still, along with the railway and
mining laborers, oil workers constituted the cream of the Mexican working class.
Labor militancy, in a way, became an effort to preserve privileged jobs in a surplus
labor market. When militancy returned to the refineries and oil fields, these
"aristocrats" among Mexican laborers would seek job security with the same measure
of intensity that they had suffered conditions of insecurity during the Depression.
Two events, one exogenous and the other endogenous, provided the opportunity for
oil workers to redress past grievances. First, Mexico pulled out of the Depression. '
In 1934, exports returned to their 1929 levels, and oil prices had recovered. The
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efficiencies and mergers accomplished by the foreign companies had permitted
Mexico to remain competitive on export markets with the new petroleum entrant,
Venezuela. El Aguila had brought in the first new oil discovery in a decade at Poza
Rica, which eventually produced 40 percent of Mexico's total crude oi!. The
domestic economy also rebounded, and domestic demand for petroleum rose
significantly. Encouraged by the government, El Aguila constructed a new refinery
outside Mexico City at Azcapotzalco and connected it to Poza Rica with a trans-
Sierra pipeline.
The second event, not unrelated, was política!. Nationalleadership had been in flux
since the assassination of President-elect Alvaro Obregón in 1928. Opportuníties
existed for the mass organizations to be heard and to make alliances with politicians
seeking to consolidate national power. The breakup of the CROM, a victim of the
inchoate political climate, permitted Lombardo Toledano's breakaway Federación
Regional de Obreros y Campesinos (FROC) to form the nucleus of an alternate
nationallabor group. The polítical opening encouraged thousands of peasants and
workers throughout the country, taking advantage of the economic resurgence, to
reorganize their groups. Strike activity rose along with demands for land reformo
Coalitions of power-seeking politicians lurched to the left to capture these popular
demands, and President Abelardo Rodríguez took the opportunity to garner popular
support for a successor who might withstand the veto power of ex-President Plutarco
Elías Calles.12 No matter what the sta te' s intentions were to control popular
demands, Cardenismo was to be no top-down reform movement. The pressure from
below in the petroleum industry began in Minatitlán and soon spread to Mexico
City, Tampico, and Poza Rica. The oil workers, motivated by keen memories of
Depression-era desperation, were about to rebuild their labor organizations from the
ground up. The necessary by-product would be a tough, demanding intermediate
leadership, the new labor caciques.
Revolution at Minatitlán
The least productive of the old Mexican oil fields generated early labor militancy by
virtue of the severity of their economic crisis. El Aguila reigned supreme on the
Isthmus. Its assets-several small oil fields of indifferent production, the Nanchital
oil terminal at Puerto México, and the refinery at Minatitlán-provided the scene of
much competition among rival unions to retain a declining number of jobs. The
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drive for labor' s control of the workplace contributed to factional disputes between
groups representing the different facilities. Their internecine rivalries spilled over
into national politics and propelled local contestants to solicit outside alliances in
order to dominate each other. The refinery leaders won out over the oil-field and
terminal groups. They did so, ultimately, by cooperating with unions representing
other refineries in fashioning a national union.
The refinery had been a CROM enclave since the 1925 strike. But the national
decline of CROM provided an occasion for rivals to dispute suzerainty. They had
help from local authorities. Company officials noted that a small mechanics union
had formed at the refinery in 1929 to challenge the dominant cromista Unión de
Obreros. The rivalry held up negotiations for the next labor contract, as municipal
authorities favored the new Frente Unico, later the Alianza. The federal labor
inspector supervised an election among the workers, judged the CROM Unión de
Obreros to be in the majority, but was overruled by the Secretariat of Industry. Bis
replacement continued the official persecution of the Unión, accusing the CROM and
company of working together to defraud the workers of their legal rights.13
The interunion struggle intensified when the company continued layoffs in the
Isthmus into 1933. All seventeen of the men laid off early in May belonged to the
Unión de Obreros and none to the Alianza. Rather than being laid off, four Alianza
men were reassigned within the plant. As management explained to the labor
inspector, El Aguila had 1,300 workers at i ts Minatitlán plant and had to give
preference to the majority union.14 Labor tensions often spilled over into local
politics, and vice versa. Manuel Fuentes in 1933 was an agrarista and president of
the Congregación of Gavilán Norte who also worked as a watchman at the Agua
Dulce oil field. The men who assassinated Fuentes were workers at El Aguila. But,
as municipal officials, they were his polítical enemies as well.15 Where did political
violence end and labor violence begin in such a sítuation?
When El Aguila began rehiring, the competition among workers and their
representatives became more intense. At the oil field of Agua Dulce, the minority
union, the Sindicato Unico, became annoyed when the company stopped deducting
union dues, thus depriving the Unico virtually of its existence. Unico officials
accused the company of favoring the rival "Agupación Blanca." Moreover, those of
its members who had suffered demotion during the Depression now discovered that
their old jobs were going to men with less skill and seniority. Few of the Unico's
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men were being reinstated to their old jobS.16 But the majority union at Agua Dulce,
whether a "white" group or not, did not permit El Aguila complete freedom in its
personnel matters. Two Mexican drillers at the nearby Francita oil field, having
learned a skill that American workers had for so long monopolized, were out of work
when Francita was scaled down. El Aguila had wanted lO transfer the men to Agua
Dulce but the majority Sindicato de Obreros blocked the transfer.17
Union leaders believed-and government officials agreed with them-that a closed
shop would reduce much of the intense competition and divisiveness between
workers. The unions would decide which applicants would be sent to company
openings. Free workers could remain at their jobs but, when they left, they would be
replaced by union members. The so-called exclusionary clause also had its
disciplinary features. If the un ion expelled a worker from membership, the company
was obliged to fire the mano The exclusionary clause was the major demand of the
Isthmanian oil workers in the spring of 1934. All the companies opposed it. El
Aguila called it unjust. While the nation's enlightened labor laws limited the
exploitation of workers by bad employers, El Aguila claimed, they did nothing to
curb the abuses of immoral labor bosses. The exclusionary clause also promoted
mediocrity in the workplace. "En la práctica," El Aguila informed President Abelardo
Rodríguez:18
probablemente significará que bajo un pretexto u otro, los trabajadores más
diestros y competentes, con el major número de años de servicio, quienes por
razón de su competencia y experiencia estén ocupando los puestos mejor
retribuídos y de mayor responsabilidad, paulatinamente serán expulsados del
Sindicato y, por tanto, despedidos por la Compañía, dando esto por resultado que
dichos trabajadores se econtrarán sin trabajo después de muchos años de servicio.
No se escapará a su ilustrado criterio la lógica de esta conclusión, por razón del
hecho de que en el caso de todos los Sindicatos en los campos petroleros y las
refinerías, la mayoría de sus miembros está compuesta, por razón natural, de los
trabajadores más ignorantes y menos diestros.
And how did some Mexican workers feel about foreign management? From the
Isthmus, one worker wrote that El Aguila:19
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trata á los trabajadores mexicanos, llegan de a casi establecer un estado de
superioridad racial entre los nuestros y los súbditos ingleses que en ella sirven.
Expone que en esa región-los trabajadores mexicanos en todas las ramas de esa
empresa, disfrutan de un salario muy inferior a los extranjeros que desempeñan las
mismas labores, siendo además objeto de toda clase de atropellos y arbitrariedades en
sus derechos. Sus habitaciones son siempre las peores y más antihigiénicas.
When workers at the Nanchital terminal went on strike in May, they demanded both
the exclusionary clause and the mandatory unionization of all foreigners. American
diplomats thought this was one way that the Mexicans could rid themselves of
foreign competition for the better oil jobs.2o Get all foreigners into the unions, then
expel them, forcing the companies to release them without severance pay.
When the big strike carne on the Isthmus in May 1934, 3,500 oil workers were off
the job. Sometime during the previous month, Luis R. Torres and his Unión de
Obreros at Minatitlán had quietly dropped their affiliation with CROM.21 The
dominant group soon rechristened itself as the Sindicato de Trabajadores, and wrested
majority representation of the refinery once again. It joined a loosely organized
Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores de la Industria del Petróleo y sus Derivados,
made up of the unions at Agua Dulce, Las Choapas, Francita, Nanchital, the
Minatitlán stevedores, and the minority Alianza of the refinery.22 The strike began
on May 12.
The chief demand was the exclusionary clause, which labor leaders wanted in order
to combat their rival "white" unions. El Aguila requested that the JFCA declare the
strike illegal, because one of the participating unions had not given due notice.
U nion leaders showed themselves to be less than united in their response. They
could not agree on the selection of a committee to represent them and missed the
scheduled hearing in Mexico City.23 Nonetheless, the unions forced the company to
agree to binding presidential arbitration. The American companies were to be furious
at the British company for giving in to the workers, for the Laudo Presidencial of
1934 would soon encourage other oil workers to request the Minatitlán contract. It
consisted of:24 the exclusionary clause; establishment of escalafones and seniority
rights for promotion; reduction of the work week to 46 1/2 hours; a basic three-
month severance pay in case of layoffs; half salaries for sick workers; medical
benefits for families of workers; equal pay for equal work; retirement benefits;
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obligatory pay for days of rest; and salary increases for workers making less than
$5.00 pesos per day.
Very soon, the company was to see how the exclusionary clause was going to
work. Unions activated the clause when they were sensitive to any loss of advantage
in their struggle with other unions over radio de acción. The Nanchital union
expelled Miguel Beltrán when he asked the El Aguila paymaster to stop deducting his
union dues from his paycheck. It viewed Beltrán as a threat to worker unity.25 The
exc1usionary clause also gave labor leaders additional ability tO interrupt the transfer
of persons within the industry. For example, the refinery union at Minatitlán
claimed jurisdiction over the new exploratory field at Campo Tigre, reserving the
jobs for fifty-one pan-time workers (eventuales) from the refinery. Then, when
some of the workers were transferred to the Nanchital terminal, its union asked that
they be fired for being hostile.26 One-hundred nineteen men involved in drilling still
could not get jobs at Agua Dulce, and the closed shop meant that the company was
forced to let them go, paying them all severance pay. Then, when Agua Dulce too
was phased back, its workers faced union opposition to their own transfer to Las
Choapas. Agua Dulce was the scene of much labor agitation in 1935 and 1936, as
the oil union, even with the exclusionary c1ause, proved unable to save jobs in
another dec1ining Isthmanian oil field.27 These out-of-work oil-field men were also
not exactly welcomed by their fellow workers at Poza Rica.
Neither the exclusionary clause, the collective contract, nor the presence of
relatively enlightened British managers (as opposed to hard-line Americans) were to
bring labor peace to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Having consolidated majority
unions within their own installations, now labor leaders began to fight among
themselves. They disputed questions of transfers and pay equalization between the
refineries and the oil fields. Most of all, they disagreed about which of them would
represent the Isthmanian oil workers at the regional and nationallevels. It was a tug-
of-war between the Minatitlán refinery and the Nanchital terminal. When Nanchital
seemed to gain the upper hand in the Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores, Luis
Torres of the refinery workers denounced its leaders as "personas extrañas, que solo
buscan su mejoramiento personal," and withdrew.28 The Minatitlán refinery union
subsequently was able to name Torres as the labor representative to the local
Comisión Mixta. Thereafter, Nanchital was reluctant 10 submit their complaints
about accidents to the commission.29 Nanchital attempted to outflank their
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Isthmanian rivals by forming a national oil workers union. This time, the refinery
men at Minatitlán called on aid from refinery unions at Tampico to deflect this threat.
Ultimately, as we shall see, the refinery workers-not the smaller terminal and oil-
field groups-would successfully create the national oil union.
Internal strife and the fact that oil unions elsewhere began winning better contracts
than the 1934 Laudo kept the Isthmus in a constant state of agitation right up to the
expropriation. The federal labor inspector at Minatitlán expressed the opinion that
mos! workers did not favor constant strikes and threats of strikes but were under the
influence of "líderes faltos de escrúpulos."30 One thing the arbitration of Abelardo
Rodríguez may have accomplished was the complete conversion of old CROM
leaders to the popular coalition supporting Lázaro Cárdenas. In the first Cárdenas-
Calles showdown in 1935, the formerly cromista leaders led the Sindicato de
Trabajadores in a victory marcho "¡Viva el General Cárdenas!" they shouted. "¡Abajo
los Jefes Máximos!"31
Unionization at Azcapotzalco
El Aguila, Mexico's largest petroleum company, fulfilled a long-term commitment
to the government when it began construction, in 1930, of the refinery at
Azcapotzalco, outside Mexico City. It could not have come at a more propitious
momento El Aguila provided employment for several hundred Mexican construction
workers. Most were unskilled peons, engaging in transitory work under individual
contracts guaranteeing them no rights to longevity. Skilled workers received a three-
day trial period before they could sign on more permanendy. "La Compañía será la
única capacitada," its officials announced, "para determinar el numero de trabajadores
que se necesitan en cada obra de construcción y las fechas en que ya no sean
necesarios los servicios de cada uno de sus trabajadores, por la disminución de las
obras. "32 Long accustomed to the Mexican proletarian's demands, El Aguila
obviously sought to avoid labor agitation at its new facility.
A nucleus of workers, nevertheless, organized the Sindicato de Obreros y
Empleados de la Refinería de El Aguila, Azcapotza1co in August 1931, long before
the refinery carne on line. Responding to that year's new labor law, they presented
the company with a collective contract that featured the exc1usionary c1ause. They
demanded that the company recognize the union, abolish individual contracts, and .
accept members for new jobs.33 The incipient Sindicato de Obreros claimed
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affiliation to the Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT), a national confederation
and longtime opponent to the CROMo Its leaders claimed that the company intended
to replace its present employees with CROM workers from Minatitlán. The
company replied that the construction work was transitory and that refining
operations necessitated workers with specialized skills. But a government-sponsored
vote of workers indicated that only one out of five favored a strike.34 No sooner had
the Sindicato de Obrero's initiative ended than a rival union group presented their
demands to the company. Affiliated to CROM, the Sindicato Unico de la Refinería
El Aguila, presented a collective contract, much less demanding on the company. A
second government-monitored vote, by a 4-to-1 margin, awarded the Unico leaders as
representative of the refinery's constructors.35 It had yet to begin operations.
Not having the exclusionary clause, the Sindicato Unico soon lost control of the
workers at the refinery. El Aguila built the new facility with contractors who
usually brought in new workers for each separate project. By the time it carne on
line in October 1934, not a single worker had been there since work began in 1930.
A majority of workers had signed on during the previous ten months. The high
turnover may have weakened the control of Sindicato Unico over the workers, for a
leadership struggle split the Unico into two factions. Another government-monitored
e1ection in July 1934 gave one faction of the Unico a 2-to-1 majority over the
other. 36
But the defeated leaders were not giving up. They joined the old minority union,
the Sindicato de Obreros, and fashioned an alliance with Lombardo Toledano. Each
rival union accused the other of being the sindicato blanco and blamed the company
for discharging its own partisans. Fights broke out at the construction site, and El
Aguila officials blamed the Unico for disruptive propagandizing during working
hours. Finally, the Obreros presented a collective contract to El Aguila and
threatened to strike if the company did not sign it. The Sindicato Unico retaliated by
demanding that the company dismiss the Obreros' leaders. President Rodríguez
sought to have both union groups dissolve in order to form one union. The Unico
refused, and shortly after Cárdenas took office, the Obreros' leaders recruited the
clerical workers at El Aguila's downtown office and reconstituted itself as the
Sindicato de Trabajadores. It then rejected the company's proffered contract identical
to that which Minatitlán workers had just won. Eventually, the new majority
Sindicato de Trabajadores gained an even better contract, complete with the
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exclusionary clause.37 The one refinery where El Aguila officials had hoped to avoid
labor problems now had an aggressive union on very good terms with Lombardo
Toledano and with sympathetic friends in Cárdenas' s labor department. While the
struggle had been between rival unions, the company was the finalloser. The new
collective contract made it quite difficult for the company to dismiss anyone who did
not wish to leave. Much the same was occurring in Tampico.
Power and Hegemony in Tampico
As elsewhere, the proletarians at Tampico suffered the unemployment of the
Depression silently. When the oil companies began rehiring in 1933, however, they
too began to take matters into their own hands, struggling as much among
themselves as against their dependence in the industrial workplace. They demanded
the assistance and recognition of local and national political authorities, and they got
it.
At Mexico's largest refinery of El Aguila, located in Tampico's industrial suburb of
Ciudad Madero, worked the largest concentration-perhaps five thousand--{)f skilled
and semiskilled Mexican laborers in the nation. They had also formed the most
important and powerful un ion in the country. Dating from 1923, the Sindicato de
Obreros, had the collective contract at the refinery. lt called for an eight-hour day, a
week's paid vacation, and severance pay for laid-off workers. From 1928 to 1932,
many of its workers had collected severance pay at one time or another. Union men
had no special right to work except as related to their skills or previous El Aguila
experience.38
Nevertheless, the refinery workers continued to fight among themselves for
whatever jurisdiction over the workplace remained for the unions. The militant leader
of the 1920s, Serapio Venegas, had been voted out of the directorate of the Sindicato
de Obreros; then, in 1932, he was assassinated. At the time, the Sindicato was
reeling from the large number of discharges of workers from the Tampico Refinery.39
New labor leadership in 1933 was spoiling to regain some of the old hegemony of
earlier days. The Sindicato de Obreros broke up into two factions. Three hundred
workers met in March to form a rival refinery union called the Sindicato de
Empleados. lt presented the refinery with a labor contract, which the company
ignored. A turf battle also broke out between oil workers and boatmen who labored
on the Pánuco River for El Aguila. At one point, pistoleros ambushed and killed
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one faction's leader, for which five labor organizers were convicted.40 State and local
officials were also implicated in the confused affair.
The interunion struggle intensified when the company began rehiring beginning in
May 1933. At the reopening of the canning factory at the Tampico refinery, the
breakaway Sindicato de Empleados accused company officials of conspiring with the
majority Sindicato de Obreros to exclude its men. Armed guards at the gate of the
canning factory even threatened members of the minority union.41 Competition for
these jobs was indeed keen, as agriculturalists too aspired to oil work. "Pués un
sinnúmero de familias organizadas carecen de pan para sus hijos," wrote a campesino
group located near Tampico, "y no es justo que gentes de otros lugares utilice citada
Compañía [de El Aguila] en trabajos de referencia quitándonos en derecho legal que
nos asiste en el presente caso.,,42 The refinery's foreign personnel managers still
decided whom lO employ and where, but the exceso de brazos motivated those who
already had jobs to obtain some measure of security in them.
In this internecine struggle, each rival labor faction sought the aid of federal
authorities, while complaining of state and local obstructionism. They also asked for
state and local intervention, while lamenting federal inactivity. Former President
Emilio Portes Gil, at the time serving as the nation's attorney general and also the
leading tamaulipequeño politician, carne to be the focus of one faction's
recriminations.43 The internal El Aguila dispute was part of larger factionalism
among local leaders that split the labor forces at Tampico. The poi ice were
summoned to one local convention in 1933, expelling fourteen labor delegations in
disfavor with municipal authorities.44 As Mexico carne out of the Depression, local
and state officials were participating in the same kind of political realignments as the
labor leaders.
In the election year of 1934, the factionalism among the workers of Tampico
became clearer. The group led by the taxi drivers union had formed the Cámara de
Trabajo and outf1anked a coalition of the stevedores union and local portesgilistas.
With the help of local officials, the Cámara pushed through a minimum wage rate at
Tampico of $3.00 pesos per day.45 National events, in the meanwhile, focused on
the strike in Minatitlán, where workers were demanding the exclusionary clause..
Workers at Tampico staged a sympathy strike, idling a total of eight thousand
workers.46 The federal government desired to unify all workers in Tampico and
throughout the country. Federal labor inspectors asked the Tampico labor leaders to
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collaborate in electing a labor representative to the three-member local Federal Board
of Conciliation. Capital and the state each would also provide a member in an effort
to "balance" the "antagonistic" elements of labor and capital. Clearly, federal
mediation accomplished linle. The Cámara del Trabajo forced a second election when
the first winner was not to their liking. As a prominent member of the Cámara, El
Aguila's resurgent refinery union gained sufficient poli tic al alliance to survive the
factional infighting. Other Tampico refinery unions at Huasteca and Pierce/Sinclair
also belonged to the Cámara. Cooperation between the powerful local unions
enabled each to maintain control of its own members, especially during the restive
time of post-Depression Tampico.47 The labor struggle was emerging from the shop
floors to local, state, and eventually nationallevels.
The workers of the Huasteca Petroleum Co. (from 1932 owned by the Standard Oil
Company, New Jersey) may have been more typical of the workers from many
smaller companies. Their whole labor struggle centered around resisting layoffs and
redundancies due to loss of production, improvements in efficiencies, and business
decline. Originally founded by Edward L. Doheny, Huasteca had been in slow decline
since 1921. The company had laid off hundreds of workers during the 1921
depression, following the broken strike of 1925, and again when it rebuilt its
Tampico refinery in 1930. U nlike El Aguila, Huasteca had discovered no new oil
field since 1920. Due to attrition, the company had been able to keep the union
relatively weak at its refining plant at Mata Redonda, across the Pánuco River from
Tampico. Workers' representatives, for that reason, relied on assistance from the
government and from fellow unionists at Tampico. "Solicitan su influencia," the
Cámara del Trabajo wrote to President Rodriguez in 1934: 48
para que sea favorable el laudo, al Sindicato Unico de Obreros y Empleados de la
Huasteca Pet. Co. en la demanda que tiene ante la Junta Fed. de Con. y Arb. contra
la Huasteca Petroleum Co. en el caso de la separación injustificada de los CC J.
Castellanos y J. Larios. Los Compañeros Larios y Castellanos son los únicos
sindicalizados en su respectivos departamentos además los que tienen mayor
antigüedad, han sido sustituídos por trabajadores nuevos. Hacen más apreciaciones
sobre el injustificado movimiento de reajustos de la Empresa.
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In 1934, the Sindicato U nico presented the company with a new collective contract,
based on the Minatitlán settlement. The union demanded the exclusionary clause for
itse1f and for El Ebano oil-field union as well, and severanee benefits for ninety-three
part-time workers laid off by Huasteca.49
The Sindicato U nico made its big push in 1935, taking on both the Huasteca
Company and the free workers. The strike began on January 23, and idled six
hundred men in the Huasteca refinery and terminal for several months. The Sindicato
Unico offered to return to work if the company would agree to arbitration by
President Cárdenas. Huasteca would have none of it. The strike dragged on through
April, exhausting the strike funds of the Sindicato Unico and those of its affiliate
unions in Tampico. The Federal Board of Conciliation (JFCA) had declared the strike
to be legal according to Mexican labor laws. Huasteca immediately brought suit
(amparo) and the Supreme Court reversed the JFCA decision. The higher decision
meant that Huasteca, by law, did not need to deal with the Sindicato Unico--or
reimburse its members for their lost pay during the strike. The latter appealed for the
direct intervention of President Cárdenas. 50
Huasteca managers took a very hard line against organized labor. They preferred to
keep the Tampico refinery permanently closed, said an American diplomat, "rather
than compromise with the workers, who have struck eight times in the past twelve
months."51 A confrontation at the refinery between free and union workers resulted
in the death of one free worker and injury of another. Ultimately, the free workers
requested military protection from the government, which federal officials were
unwilling to do because the Sindicato Unico might consider it an aggression.52 The
strike failed at the end of November 1935. The Sindicato Unico's ultimate lack of
success in gaining a collective contract similar to El Aguila's refinery union rankled
the leaders. They cooperated with their brethren at the larger El Aguila refinery in
forming a national oil union, but they were in no position to provide leadership.
The struggle to form the national oil workers union further enhanced the strength of
the Tampico refinery unions. Apparently, the idea had begun in Puerto México and
enticed a number of small oil-field unions to attempt to form the Sindicato Nacional
de la Industria Petrolera y sus Derivados. But the Tampico workers as well as the
refinery laborers at Minatitlán viewed this national petroleum union as a provocation.
Based on their larger membership and importance to the industry, these refinery
unions wanted to be the organizers of a national union-or have none at all.53 When
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the smaller groups of petroleum workers met in Mexico City in July 1935, the
refinery unions and their supporting labor organizations from around the country
denounced them as "white unions" (company unions) and requested government
officials to deny them support.54 The Sindicato Nacional failed to effect a viable
national union of petroleum workers.
Plainly, 1935 was a critical year for cooperation between the large refinery unions
within the oil industry. They communicated between Minatitlán, Azcapotzalco,
Ciudad Madero, and Mata Redonda, frequently launching sympathy strikes for each
other and for the smaller oil-field groups that cooperated with them. Allied unions at
Tampico could also be counted on to strike on their behalf, especially the aggressive
chauffeurs union, an influential member of the Cámara del Trabajo. Tampico's
Sindicato de Obreros had expanded its membership to several of El Aguila' s oil fields
in Northern Veracruz. They had members at Pánuco, Naranjos, the loading terminal
at Tuxpan, and the new oil field at Poza Rica. In 1935, numerous strikes broke out
within the industry in efforts to equalize pay and benefits between the refineries and
the oil fields. Said President Cárdenas of the rash of strikes in the oil and other
industries: They were "a simple manifestation of the state of injustice in which
certain companies keep the workers."55 Later, when the national oil union was
formed, however, the president did not view these strikes so tolerantIy.
In the meanwhile, the mounting political tension between President Cárdenas and
ex-President Calles on the nationallevel had parallels in Mexican industrial cities
like Tampico. The Cámara del Trabajo became allied with the left wing of the
Mexican Senate and with General Francisco Múgica. The group sponsored "direct
action" against the local supporters of the governor of Tamaulipas, who was allied
to Portes Gil. Mobs invaded city council chambers and the press rooms of local
newspapers. Rumor had it that the Cámara also wanted to purge the leadership of the
U nión de Alijadores, Tampico' s oldest union, dating from 1911, by inciting a mob
takeover of the dockworkers' headquarters. The February 1936 parade in support of
the Tampico mayor, who had just been dismissed by the governor, provided the
occasion. Shots rang out at the end of the parade, and an angry crowd set upon the
Alijadores building. The local poI ice and military authorities were either unprepared
to intervene or actually favored the Cámara. They did nothing to stop the riot. At
the end of the day, three members of the dockworkers' group had been killed and
thirteen injured compared to one killed and four wounded among the attackers.56
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Once Calles was forced into exile, the plans for the formation of a national
petroleum union solidified, with the refinery unions in the forefront. The El Aguila
refinery group rechristened itself as Section 1 of the Sindicato de Trabajadores
Petroleros de la República Mexicana (STPRM). The Huasteca refinery union became
Section 2. Lombardo Toledano, who had just organized the Confederación de
Trabajadores de México (CTM), carne to court the Tampico labor leaders behind
closed doors. Local refinery unions leaders refused to declare their intentions of
joining the CTM just yet. Several small petroleum unions still opposed the
STPRM. La Corona' s workers at Pánuco remained loyal to CROMo The workers at
Petro-Mex and Gulf had no unions at alP7
The accretion of power by the Tampico refinery workers of El Aguila was not
accomplished without producing some disgruntlement, some envy. Representatives
of field workers in Tuxpan and Papantla protested their exclusion by Section 1 leaders
during talks with the company. Other workers, even at the Tampico refinery itself,
disliked being branded "renegades" and being excluded from work contracts because
they did not "comulgan con [las] ideas" of the Section 1 leaders.58 By virtue of the
fact that it gathered together the largest conglomeration of workers-6,500 me n-El
Aguila's refinery union also served as vanguard in the formation of the national
petroleum union. National oil union leaders next sought confirmation of their power
with an industrywide labor contract.
The Struggle for a National Contraet
The 1936 formation of the STPRM, as we have seen, was not the beginning of
labor' s attempt to control the workplace. This struggle against layoffs and for
stability in the lives of the proletarians had been occurring since 1915, if not before.
The struggle intensified as a result of the destitution that oil workers suffered during
the Depression. Formation of the STPRM, therefore, was but another stage in this
struggle. Yet, the formation of one union within the oil industry raised the level of
combat from the refineries and oil fields to national and intemational politics. It did
not mean that shop-floor militancy was now over. On the contrary, local struggles
for leadership and for the loyalty of workers continued, keeping relentless pressure on
nationallabor leaders and politicians to provide security for workers in the industry.
Leaders of the STPRM and the CTM knew that if they did not satisfy the demands
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from below, their claim to the power and perquisites at the umon helm was
worthless. Doubtless, President Cárdenas felt these same pressures.
But the foreigners, even the oilmen, at the time, believed that Mexican labor
radicalism started at the topo As a British diplomat in Mexico City cabled during the
Cárdenas-Calles showdown, "Present Gov't seem to think that their safest insurance
against a return of the Calles régime is to organise labour in their support. The
Calles gang, on the other hand, has always sought to embarrass their successors by
promoting labour unrest. Labour is thus the tool of contending political groups and
encouraged by both to fresh extravagances."59 As this analysis of the petroleum
workers indicates, however, labor militancy originated on the shop floors. Their
leaders understood as mucho
Mindful that they had to gain a victory to keep the loyalty of their members, the
STPRM leaders conferred tirelessly to propose an industrywide collective contract. It
demanded a $30 million peso (approximately$8.3 million U .S.) wage increase and
the equalization of salaries among the eighteen petroleum, terminal, and ship
companies whose workers STPRM represented.60 For the workers, there were lO be
eighteen holidays (including Day of the Petroleum Worker), ample death and sick
benefits, twenty to sixty days of paid vacation, vacation travel, and complete medical
insurance. Many of these benefits were lO embrace the families as well as the
worker. If aman were to quit his job, he would get twenty-five days' pay for each
year of work. If laid-off, he would get ninety days' pay plus twenty-five days' credit
per each year of service to the company. In all cases, laid-off workers would lose no
seniority rights and would receive preference in rehiring.
These and other provisions of the proffered contract provided for extensive labor
participation in management. All the obligations and expense of the contract were to
be borne by the companies. Much of the power over personnel matters was to be
assumed by STPRM leaders. The company would have had to pay for transportation,
equipment and uniforms for union musical groups, cars for union leaders, a house for
each worker. The companies were to provide schools, libraries, savings funds, and
sport s clubs to be run by the unions. Union leaders were to confer with company
personnel managers in all promotions. They would run the technical schools,
supported financially by the companies, that would train Mexican technicians who
would replace the foreigners. The companies would pay for the clerical workers in
STPRM's own offices as well as deduct union dues automatically from each worker's
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paycheck. Moreover, the salaries of STPRM officials were to be paid by the
compames.
The contract assaulted the remaining employer privileges in the workplace: the
puestos de confianza and the right to hire and fire. Confidential positions
traditionally lay outside union control altogether. Now STPRM demanded that they
be reduced to 110 throughout the entire Mexican oil industry. El Aguila would retain
only one confidential position (at the time, it had thirteen) at its Azcapotzalco
refinery, that of the general manager.61 All other supervisory positions would be
filled by union men more or less on a strict basis of seniority. Most of all, much of
the power to hire and tire workers was removed from the company to the union, the
ultimate implication of the exclusionary clause. "Las Compañías se obligan a
suspender a los trabajadores que el Sindicato acuerdo disciplinar," the proposed
contract said, "y por todo el tiempo que la disciplina dure: sin que las Compañías
tengan que calificar la procedencia o improcedencia de tales disciplinas."62 If the
abilities to punish and to reward were the twin pillars of social power, then oil union
leaders fully expected to wrest that power from the companies. They aimed to do it
by means of the proposed industrywide labor contract of 1936.
STRPM delivered the contract to the companies on 3 November 1936 and demanded
approval before a November 17 strike deadline. The companies' response was
predictable. "The Union draft contains over 250 clauses, covers 165 pages of legal
size script of which almost 40 embrace the wage schedule, and took several months
to formulate," said the companies. "And yet, the companies were to 'discuss' and
'approve' the document in the peremptory period of ten (10) days."63 The smaller
firms protested that they could not agree to equaIization because they were unabIe to
pay the high saIaries that El AguiIa and Huasteca were paying their workers. The
latter two big companies, on principIe, also resisted raising the wages of the highest-
paid workers in the country. Although executives and labor leaders aIike couched
their public utterances in terms of salaries, the pay issue actually was subservient to
the issue of worker control.
The proposed contract of 1936 would have eroded capital' s flexibility to compete in
the marketpIace. Labor's efforts to unionize even the occasional and part-time
workers meant that companies would no longer be able to hire short-term labor for
special projects. If they did, they would never be abIe to let workers go when the job
was completed. The 1936 contract also would have signaIed the end of contracting
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work within the industry. Companies depended upon construction and drilling
contractors to perform ad hoc jobs, for which the contracting agency provided its own
workers. Moreover, the companies objected to the difficulties they would encounter
in firing incompetent or poor workers. A worker was to be discharged only for
"grave and infamous" causes, which would be reviewed by a union-management
panel. The companies said that, under the 1936 contract, they would have lost all
rights to transfer or promote their employees.
Since the companies could not agree to the new contract, an industrywide strike
appeared inevitable. Such a strike would have disrupted urban transit, power
generation, industrial production, and agricultural harvests throughout the country. 1t
threatened additional labor unrest in other sectors. Therefore, President Cárdenas
intervened to convince the workers and employers to discuss the contract while oil
workers continued at their posts. The state acted as host and moderator of the
dispute. Formal talks between STPRM leaders and the industry's attomeys were held
at the Department of Labor before itsjefe, Genaro V. Vásquez. The companies too
wanted labor stability over a long period of time, but not at the expense of worker
control. Moreover, each company needed to approve the final accord. For its part,
the STPRM had to deliver a contract that was better than any existing contract or face
a dissatisfied rank and file.64 The hiatus between the positions of the workers and
employers seemed insurmountable. 1ndeed, it was.
The union leaders attending the negotiations soon tired of the nitpicking of
company lawyers. "No es la primera vez que no nos hemos podido entender con los
Líes. Guerrero y White," commented one veteran labor leader. "Con los patrones que
son los directamente interesados hemos podido ponemos de acuerdo mejor que con
ellos. Cada vez que hemos tratado con los patrones hemos llegado a un fin
practico."65 CTM chief Lombardo Toledano, who was a licenciado too, attended the
final sessions. He spoke eloquentIy for the individual worker's need for security.
Lombardo asked that "el trabajador que pierde su empleo tenga siguiera una pequeña
cantidad de dinero que le permita buscar fortuna en un país como el nuestro que por
desgracia también no abunde el trabajo. "66 These state-sponsored labor talks broke
down at the end of May 1937.
President Cárdenas intervened a second time, after a national oil strike, by getting
the unions to accept economic study of the oil companies. As stipulated in the 1931
labor law, the economic investigations would determine whether the companies could
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afford the proposed labor contract. Professor Jesús Silva Herzog of UNAM led a
team of three experts who made up the Comisión Pericial en el Conflicto de Orden
Económico de la Industria Petrolera. During the months of June and July 1937,
Silva Herzog collected statistics, testimony, and evidence on taxes, profits, expenses,
and wages. The companies told the commission that the labor bill was much higher
than the wage hikes indicated. El Aguila calculated the contract would increase its
labor costs by $142.6 million pesos per year.67 Working under pressure, the
commission's study was presented to the public on August 14. It carne in the form
of recommendations to the Junta Federal de Conciliación y Arbitraje (JFCA), which
was to settle the labor dispute that the companies and labor leaders had been unable to
negotiate. The JFCA's deliberations continued throughout the remainder of 1937.
On March 3, it finally confirmed the commission's findings, giving the workers a
$26.4 million peso pay raise and granting the labor leaders many of their managerial
demands. The companies filed an injunction (amparo) against the JFCA's ruling, but
Mexico's supreme court, having been reconstituted thoroughly during the Cárdenas
years, upheld the JCFA ruling on 2 March 1938. In effect, the state was attempting
to resolve a conflict that employers and labor leaders could noto
But the companies still refused to abide by the decision. The foreign oilmen had
been saying that the union' s demand for pay increases and participation in
management wou1d bankrupt the already unprofitable Mexico-based companies.
"Owing to the present restricted number of supervisory positions," they claimed in
December 1937, "the industry is already suffering the consequences of lack of control
and discipline."68 If labor agitation made Mexican oil any more expensive, they
warned, it would be undersold in foreign markets by cheaper Venezuelan crudes. The
Mexican government, consequently, would lose oil-export revenues. Moreover, the
companies did not believe that the Mexicans could run an oil industry themselves.
Thus, they laid the challenge before President Cárdenas. He would have to discipline
the workers for them. The companies simply refused to opera te in Mexico under the
labor conditions arranged by the Mexican political system.
Company executives and some foreign diplomats subsequently believed that the
ultimate nationalization of the oil industry had been a plot of Cárdenas. He used
labor only as a foil, a diversion, and a ruse, they were soon to sayo Naturally, the
president's motivations remain somewhat enigmatic. As early as 1935, the British
ambassador quoted him as musing about the "advantage which would accrue to the
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nation through the direct control by the state . . . of some of the basic industries,
such as . . . the production of fue!." A second diplomat quoted Cárdenas, two years
later, hinting "that the time is not far off when Mexico will be rípe for the
nationalisation of the oil industry."69 But was this his long-term goal? Both of
these remarks, intended perhaps to reach the ears of oil managers to get them to make
an agreement with their workers, had been made by the president during labor strife in
the oil fields. Cárdenas may have envisioned oil nationalization as a method of
mollifying the demands of the workers.
His actual actions, however, belied a policy of conciliation between the companies
and the workers. It had been his idea to force the workers first to enter into direct
talks with the employers, next to ask for an economic investigation, then to await a
lCFA decision, and finally to wait for the Supreme Court's resolution of the appeal.
Even after the Supreme Court had handed down its judgment, he asked the workers to
allow the companies time to agree to this final ruling. Only then did the possibility
of an actual nationalization enter his plans. He confided in Múgica that he would
have no choice but to expropríate, if the companies resisted the Supreme Court
judgment.70
One thing should be made dear: Cárdenas did not need to expropríate the industry to
uphold Artide 27 of the Constitution. In December 1937, Cárdenas and El Aguila
signed an agreement, in which the oil company seemed to renounce its prívate
property ríghts to the new Poza Rica oil field. The British company agreed to
"concessionary" status at Poza Rica, paying government royalties amounting to 25
to 35 percent of production. Therefore, one foreign company had tacitly conceded
government ownership of its oil property, as stipulated in the Mexican
Constitution.71 Cárdenas expected that the other oil companies, in time, would come
round to accept the provisions of the Mexican Constitution. Artide 27 of the
Constitution, after all, did not mandate the establishment of a state petroleum
monopoly--only national ownership of the petroleum deposits. The constituyentes
had contemplated that the prívate companies would operate in Mexico under
concessionary contracts with the government, much as prívate individuals had mined
the colonial sil ver deposits, paying a "royalty" to the Crown, which theoretically
owed the subsoil wealth. The Poza Rica compromise was just such an agreement.
Circumstances dictated that workers, motivated by their own interests, would give
another meaning to Artide 27.
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Oil Worker Pressure 00 the State
Workers and their leaders had always appealed to the state to attend to their
grievances. Gil workers carried these traditions forward into the twentieth century.
They corresponded directIy with the president, with the appropriate national agencies,
and with state and local political factions. They also calculated their strike activity to
gain the intervention of the state into their affairs-preferably on their behalf.
Political activity beca me especially critical to the oil workers. They were struggling
to preserve for themselves positions of security in an industry notorious for the
prerogatives of ownership. Shell and Standard Gil New Jersey, which controlled El
Aguila and Huasteca, respectively, were among the largest industrial enterprises in
the world. Pan of their economic power was due to their ability to adjust production
and employment on a international scale. After all, they had to survive in a volatile
and competitive world petroleum market. The companies' power did not deter the
workers. But it made state intervention so much more critical to the achievement of
their goals. If the workers were to gain any security in the industry, they needed
strong leaders who could negotiate successfully with politicians. When the
government faltered, the workers were capable of prodding them. When their own
union leaders faltered, the workers knew how to prod them as well.
From the moment that the national contract was delivered to the companies, the oil
workers applied direct, unrelenting pressure on all the parties. The strike was their
weapon. As STPRM finished their draft of the proposed contract in November 1936,
Tampico's El Aguila workers returned after a twenty-three-day walkout. Their
colleagues at the nearby Pierce-Sinclair refinery ended a fifty-six-day strike.72
Certainly, labor factionalism did not end just because STPRM had entered into
national-level negotiations. Labor talks had to be suspended in January 1937 so that
Section 1 could de al with the stevedores' unions over who controlled the unloading of
oil cargos at Tampico. Then, when employers were reluctant to resume national
talks, Section 1 ordered a one-day work stoppage.73
The major oil strike in the industry began at the end of June 1937, following the
breakdown in the management-labor talks. All companies except for Mexican Gulf
and Petro-Mex (which had no unions) had to suspend operations. Gil tankers left
Tampico without their usual cargoes of exported petroleum; cargo vessels could not
get fuel oil in any of the pons of the Mexican Gulf Coast. Pon cities suffered a los s
in port fees; the federal government, a loss in customs duties.74 Within a week, the
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strike produced hostilities in Mexico City. Oil workers placed red-and-black strike
flags at Petro-Mex depots, because the state company was selling to tourists and
private companies. The taxistas and truckers were annoyed that the government
favored the bus drivers with rationed gasoline. They blocked several major
thoroughfares in the city. Finally, Cárdenas intervened directly with labor, getting
them to suspend the oil strike after thirteen days, in exchange for an economic
investigation of the companies.75
The rank-and-file oil workers were miffed about the compromise. They began a
series of their own "wildcat strikes," local uncoordinated shutdowns of short duration.
Several members of the STPRM delegation, which had ended the strike at the
insistence of President Cárdenas, were voted out of office when they returned to their
union locals. Part-time workers at the Cerro Azul oil field of Huasteca accosted four
Huasteca officials, two of whom were Mexican. The part-time workers would have
been considered full-timers if the company had signed the labor contract. "The
workers seem to feel that the union leaders in Mexico did not properly back up their
demands," a U.S. diplomat at Tampico reported, "and that accordingly they have to
act for themselves."76 These wildcat strikes were intended to force the Comisión
Pericial to make a favorable report. From Yucatán, where he was turning over land
to campesinos, President Cárdenas wired a request for no more wildcat oil strikes,?7
Few petroleum workers paid much attention.
Animosity still existed at the Huasteca refinery and terminal at Mata Redonda.
Section 2 struck on a number of occasions in September and October 1937 to obtain
its own local contract, in lieu of a national contract. The labor agitation there
continued, intermittentIy in November and December. Several of the renegade work
stoppages of December indicated the locals' frustration at the length of the JFCA's
deliberations. At least, that was the reason why Section 1 threatened a twenty-four-
hour paro at the Tampico refinery of El Aguila. Cárdenas expressed his displeasure
in the nation's newspapers,?8 The Huasteca company's hostile response to the JFCA
decision which, it thought, was favorable to the workers, provoked additional worker
resentment. The Standard Oil affiliate closed twenty-three wells and ordered all the
oil stored in the field to be moved to its terminal at Tampico. In his last pay
envelope of December 1937, each Huasteca worker got a message saying the
company would not be able to comply with the JFCA decision. SubsequentIy,
Section 2 leaders became angered at the Mexican Huasteca managers who were
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detennined to close down the acid plant at the Mata Redonda refinery. The managers,
Borrego and Noyola, previously had shut down the tenninal at Tuxpan in 1932. The
foreign oilmen concluded that more than ninety unauthorized strikes had plagued the
petroleum industry during the last six months of 1937.79 The positions of the
workers and their employers did not seem to leave much room for negotiation.
The oil proletarians of Poza Rica gained the reputation as the biggest troublemakers
in the entire petroleum industry. Much of the grass-roots militancy at Poza Rica
stemmed from problems connected to radio de acción. El Aguila's new, expanding
oil field during the 1930s did not suffer, like most other oil workplaces, a
deterioration in the number of workers. But even in expansion, workers competed
against each other for rights to work, and their organizations, for rights to represento
In expanding its work force here in the early 1930s, the British company had sent out
experienced workers from Tampico. Therefore, the Sindicato de Trabajadores, later
Section 1, from El Aguila' s Tampico refinery claimed first jurisdiction over Poza
Rica. Prior residents of the area felt slighted, thinking that they ought to have gotten
the jobs. Thus, the Sindicato de Obreros y Jornaleros de la Zona Petrolera de los ex-
Cantones de Tuxpan y Papantla said it spoke for 5,600 Veracruzanos who resented
the invasion of the Tampico union.8o
Moreover, Section 1 used its privileges under its collective contract won at
Tampico to control who was hired. It rejected a Mexican technician that the
company had sent to engineering school because the man carne from the Minatitlán
refinery. Section 1 had gained enormous power in controlling Poza Rica workers. A
strike here was felt in Mexico City, supplied via pipeline from Poza Rica, and the
capital had only ten days' worth of fuel in storage at any one time.81 The nation-
and government officials--could withstand prolonged oil strikes anywhere else but
Poza Rica.
These oil-field unionists found their opportunity to break away from Section 1
following the June strike, when the rank-and-file anger at the economic investigation
underrnined some STPRM leaders. By July, Poza Rica had its own STPRM
representation, Section 30, which defied the government as well as the central
committee of the national oil union. It shut down the flow of oil to Mexico City
with wildcat strikes throughout the summer and fallo Other companies and other
facilities attempted to make up the shortfall in supplies at the capital, but
transportation and industrial slowdowns occurred, as did speculation in fuel
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supplies.82 So great was the grass-roots concern for job stability that the contract
ending the dispute in early September took pains to name workers to specific posts
and at specified wages. Nevertheless, not everyone was satisfied. When additional
walkouts at Poza Rica exasperated him, Cárdenas once again felt compelled to
criticize the "lack of discipline" of the oil unions. He suggested that they may be
working for "capitalist interests," inasmuch as their tactics were turning the country
against the labor movement. 83 The Poza Rica workers carne in off the picket lines,
not because their president had requested it in the national interest, but because the
company agreed to pay 75 percent ofthe workers' salary during the strike and 25,000
pesos ($7,000 U.S.) to the union.84
A brief review of the minutes of the Section 30's assemblies for the months
leading up to the oil expropriation reveal what did and what did not motivate the rank
and file at Poza Rica. There was no discussion at all of the companies' defiance of
the JFCA and Supreme Court rulings. There were no denouncements of foreign
imperialism or demands for the nationalization of the industry. Workers at the oil
fields concerned themselves with radio de acción. They discussed agreements with
affiliate unions over who obtained the rights to work in the outlying fields. They
argued over whether a contract should be let to J. Heflye for road building. Questions
of union membership for individual s were al so discussed, sometimes heatedly if there
was a hint that the new worker had once collaborated with management. They
sometimes defied STPRM's national leadership on these issues. And they also
discussed what happened to three months' worth of union dues that had disappeared
from the treasury. At one point the secretary recorded: "El compañero Domingo hace
uso de la palabra diciendo que el dinero es el mismo lío de siempre, que no se sabe
nunca en realidad cuanto hay en caja ni cuanto se debe."85 But the Poza Rica rank-
and-file did not express any opinions whatsoever about the expropriation of the
industry in which they worked. And yet, their relentless pressure on their own union
leaders led to just that outcome.
The direct demands that the men in the oil refineries and fields placed on the labor
leadership explain why the STPRM, in February and March of 1938, refused to meet
the companies halfway. The STPRM ignored an offer by the oil companies to raise
salaries by a total of 23.5 million pesos rather than 26.4 million pesos as stipulated
by the JFCA decision. It represented a 100 percent raise in the company's offer of
the year before. They also prevented the government from compromising on the
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labor contract. At the second CTM congress in February 1938, the STPRM
delegation suggested that all five thousand delegates call on the president of the
Supreme Court to request that the justices hasten their final decision.86
Given their activism right up to the last moment, the oil unions were not mere
bystanders at the expropriation itself. They participated actively. When the
companies disc10sed that they could not obey the Supreme Court decision, the
STPRM called for a strike to begin at midnight on 18 March 1938. It announced a
day of protest against the foreign oil companies for March 23, the CTM promising
to sponsor a giant demonstration on the Zocalo. The workers themselves anticipated
their leaders. They seized control of the El Aguila loading terminal at Tampico and
shut down the Huasteca pipelines days before the strike was supposed to have
begun.87 One might wonder what labor unrest might have occurred if Cárdenas had
not nationalized the oil industry on March 18, hours before the strike deadline.
Workers thereupon seized the rest of the oil facilities throughout the nation: gas
stations, distribution depots, tugboats, barges, trucks, refineries, wells, pipelines,
company offices, and payrolls. Foreigners and Mexicans who had held puestos de
confianza were dismissed, and union locals appointed their own officials to
supervisory positions. The transition was particularly vindictive at the Huasteca
facilities. Managers fled the oil fields under threats to their lives. For several days,
Section 2 leaders detained the Mexican officials of the company, Borrego and Noyola,
until nationallabor leaders arrived to negotiate their release.88 In the meantime, the
CTM turned its March 23 protest into organized labor's celebration of itself.
The enthusiasm with which most oil workers welcomed the expropriation cannot
be diminished by the fact that they never did obtain their wage increases. The
activities of workers at the refineries and oil fields following the Depression of 1930
show that the level of wages, a1though important, may have been secondarily so to
most oil workers. First and foremost, the individual who lent his services to the oil
industry wanted a steady job. He wanted to leave at his own choosing-not the
company's.
Several conditions of industrial employment threatened worker security. In the first
place, the company's personnel managers controlled who was hired, who was fired,
and who was promoted. They made their determinations based on ability and,
perhaps, tractability. Yet, the reservation of the topmost management jobs for
foreigners placed a ceiling on how far the most capable and hardest-working Mexican
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could rise. Second, the employers based their personnel decisions on impersonal
market conditions. When prices of petroleum softened because of falling demand or
rising supply on a world scale, the companies sought to remain competitive by
cutting back on labor expenses. They consolidated, closed down facilities, added
labor-saving technologies, and laid off hundreds of workers. Third, and finally, the
competition for jobs in the 1930s was keen. Working in the petroleum industry
conferred prestige and superior material benefits on the individual. The oil worker, as
a labor aristocrat, wished to control the competition for his envied position. The
Depression made manifest that many a bumpkin just off the ejido would very much
like his job. As long as the companies controlled access to the workplace, the
Mexican oillaborer could never be sure that his skill and experience would guarantee
him a place in the industry. These were the reasons why some of the most privileged
workers in Mexico became militant union organizers in the 1930s. Deterioration of
the foreign-owned Mexican oil industry had produced the very antithesis of security
for the proletarians. Nearly thirty-five thousand jobs were lost between 1921 and
1935.
Their struggle, however, most often pitted members of the working c1ass against
each other. Why? Workers wanted to control the competitive labor market as much
as possible, at the same time that they strove to effect guarantees that the disastrous
layoffs would not occur again. To accomplish these two objectives, they
reconstituted their unions, making them stronger and more able to confront the
companies. The intemecine fights amounted to a process of natural selection. Those
unions emerging from the strife of 1934 and 1935 proved exceptionally combative.
Their leaders were tough-minded and boldo The struggle for the c10sed shop met part
of the agenda of the rank-and-file workers. But it did not fulfill all of the warkers'
criteria for security. As long as the companies retained control of personnel matters,
the warkers could not be certain that their gains might not be reversed. The same
uncertainty held true if a few pockets of employer privilege remained in the form of
nonunionized companies and of some unions having no exc1usionary c1ause. The
remedy was a collective contract severely limiting employer prerogatives. Far
security, therefore, the worker was counting on his union. It was certainly more
tangible and familiar to him than the distant and unpredictable world economy.
Neither could the state-nor the Constitution of 1917, nor the 1931 labor law, nar
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Cárdenas himself--deliver the security that an industrywide union could. Therefore,
the workers made the STPRM, from the ground up, so to speak.
In the interim, however, the struggle engendered two inevitable and familiar
characteristics: powerful middle-levellabor bosses and a politicized labor movement.
How can one explain these phenomena, both of which then and since have rendered
the individual worker sometimes vulnerable to abuse and manipulation? The worker
needed a powerful, intrepid leader who could manage the intense competition for jobs.
He also had to be capable of negotiating assistance from politicians, the better to
confront recalcitrant employers. If that labor boss dipped his hand into un ion funds,
well, that was the same old mess as always. The worker was substituting a familiar,
hopefully benign, tyranny of a Mexican cacique for the impersonal tyranny of an
international capitalist marketplace that had proven itself-so far as the laborer was
concemed-remarkably unreliable.
The worker al so sought assistance from the state and from those competing for
power to control the state. Mexicans had established a strong tradition of seeking
redress of grievances from a political arbitrator--the village head, the jefe poUtico,
the state governor, and the president himself. The presence of powerful foreign
employers might have reinforced this poli tic al imperative in modern Mexico. There
were few alternatives to a strong labor-state alliance if workers were to match the
power of a foreign employer loathe to give them guarantees. The abuse of labor
caciques and the manipulation by politicians were nothing new to the worker-but at
least they were Mexican. And workers had helped get rid of bad labor leaders and
politicians before.
For its part, the state under Cárdenas promoted labor unity, consistent with 'its
policy of balancing the "antagonistic interests" of capital and labor. The Cardenista
state conceived of all workers being organized into large industrial unions partly as a
means to providing social peace in the industrial world. Cárdenas himself tolerated
strikes when workers were organizing their unions. But once unions were formed,
Cárdenas also expected that labor strife would end, as evidenced in his condemnation
of the wildcat oil strikes. The state obviously viewed the labor union as a form of
social discipline. The worker viewed it as a form of social security.
Given these perspectives, was the Mexican oil expropriation inevitable? Perhaps it
was in the long run, but the state did not necessarily need to create a national oil
company in 1938 to achieve social discipline. Likewise, the workers did not demand
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it. Both parties seemed to act on the belief that the proposed collective contract of
1936 sufficed to provide security and discipline. Aside from what analysts have said
about sovereignty and economic emancipation, the Mexican oil expropriation came
about as a historical quirk. The international oil interests had already passed on to
Venezuela and were soon to enter the Middle East. Under these circumstances, the
petroleum companies did not think the Mexican petroleum industry was worth the
compromise of its traditional employer prerogatives. Mexican oil workers thought
otherwise, and the rest, as they say, is history.
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